fully to the characteristics of the EU's energy island, whereas the Russian Federation, as a dominant energy supplier, abused the circumstances, executed a coercive energy policy, thus posing threats not only for energy but also for economic and national security. However, in 2015, having constructed alternative electricity and gas supply routes and established market conditions in the energy sector, Lithuania reached a turning point and pulled away from energy dependency on Russia. Lithuania is to be regarded as a good case of the EU energy island to study.
Introduction
2015 was the crucial year for Lithuanian energy -the turning point was reached in the domain of energy security. In 2015, a liquefied natural gas terminal (LNG), "Independence", which arrived in Lithuania in autumn of 2014, started to operate in the port of Klaipėda and electricity interconnections Poland and Sweden were completed and switched on. Lithuania built up alternative routes for supplies of natural gas and electricity, eliminated energy dependence on Russia, a dominant external supplier, and resolved the problem of an EU energy island.
The turning point is a proper time to reflect, reassess Lithuania's energy security and to crystalize the measures that enabled it to break away from the EU energy island. Therefore, this article seeks to answer the following questions:
• How can one describe the phenomenon of an EU energy island?
• What are the characteristics of an EU energy island?
• Does the status of an energy island pose a threat to security? • How the problem of an energy island was resolved?
The Phenomenon of an Energy Island in the EU
It is hardly possible to say when the concept of an "energy island" appeared publically for the first time and who its author was. Yet, knowing that three Baltic states were among the first to whom the term "EU's energy island" was attributed, the birth of the concept may be linked with the initiative of the Baltics to flag energy isolation from the remaining part of the EU and asymmetrical reliance on the Russian Federation.
In 2006, the European Commission's Green Paper on European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive, and Secure Energy, points out that the Baltic states, as well as Ireland and Malta, 'remain an "energy island", largely cut off from the rest of the Community. ' 1 The possible impact of "energy island" status in the case of Lithuania was perceived when the first reactor of the Ignalina nuclear power plant (hereinafter referred to as the Ignalina NPP) had already been closed, and the time when the second reactor, that is the final shut down of a whole nuclear plant, was approaching. 2 The Ignalina NPP provided approximately 70 per cent of all electricity consumed in Lithuania and played an important role in the supply of electricity throughout the whole Baltic states region. Being aware of the consequences of losing such an important source of energy, the 14 th Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Lithuania set up the Commission, headed by former Prime Minister Aleksandras Abišala, to secure a supply of energy after 2009. 3 Negotiations on Lithuania's membership in the EU were completed in 2002, so right then the commitments were assumed to fully close the Ignalina NPP by 2010. Therefore, the decision made to take care of energy supply security, which were made only in 2008, should be considered belated. Nonetheless, activity of the Commission led by Abišala was significant, since the phenomenon of Lithuania as an energy island was conceptualized and the issue of isolation of the Baltic states from the common EU energy market was brought to the priorities of the EU agendas.
The Lithuanian Energy Institute's study on the impact on Lithuania's economic security (2008) concludes that "Lithuania, at least until 2014, may remain an energy island, because the possibilities of building electricity interconnections between Lithuania-Poland and Lithuania-Sweden over the next six years are very limited". 4 Assessing the activities of the 14 th Government of the Republic of Lithuania, the 15 th Government of the Republic of Lithuania, in its annual report, states that "the Baltic states in the EU's energy system were still like an island without electricity networks, gas pipelines and interconnections with Western Europe".
5
In October 2008, on the eve of the European Council, the meeting of all the Baltic Sea EU Heads of State and the European Commission took place at the Permanent Representation of Lithuania to the EU in Brussels, where President of the Commission, José Manuel Barroso, acknowledged that the Baltic states, having no interconnections with the EU energy networks, 6 are even more vulnerable than any other Member State.
7 Also, Barroso declared that "energy islands" are to be connected, and announced a six-step roadmap. concluded in October 2008 that "particular attention will be paid to interconnections and to the connection of the most isolated European countries, to the interface of European networks with supply infrastructure and to the need to diversify both sources and routes".
10 It was also stated that "the European Council supports the Commission initiative of establishing a plan of action to speed up interconnections in the Baltic Sea region".
11
The concept of energy islands was firmly embedded in EU documents dealing with the security of energy supply. 12 In 2011, the European Council concluded that no EU Member State should remain isolated from the European gas and electricity networks after 2015. 13 This was once again confirmed in the conclusions in May 2013.
14 Such wording, on the top of the EU political agenda, appeared mostly following the initiative of the Baltic states, however, identification of the concrete objective and its reiteration proves that the phenomenon of an energy island and the need to resolve the problem were recognized by all EU Member States.
The Characteristics of an EU Energy Island and the Theoretical Basis of Research
The concept "island" stands for exclusion and isolation. In the case of an energy island, along with exclusion there comes a factor of dependence, that is, either from a single supplier or from a single type of fuel. Normally, energy islands emerge due to geographical and historical conditions. Latvian expert Reinis Āboltinš identifies the following characteristics of energy islands: dependency on one supplier; dependency on one major energy source; dependency on one supply route; increasing consumption of energy; limited or no energy market. 15 If one is to treat these criteria as correct, however, considering that Āboltinš examined the cases of different geographical regions -the three Baltic states, Spain, and Portugal -it does not necessarily mean that all five criteria in their scope are indispensable to each separate country.
A major challenge for an energy island is energy security -that is, to 
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ensure a stable supply of energy sources at reasonable prices. Taking into consideration the factor of an "island", according to Āboltinš, there dominates one route of supply, one major energy source, and one supplier. Energy supply from one dominating supplier should not be a problem, provided the buyer's and the supplier's relations are based on the principles of market, transparency, and international law -thus how the partnership is built. The situation aggravates when the energy supplier starts to abuse its dominating position with a purpose to use energy dependence of an importing country not only for economic but also for other purposes such as geopolitical. Then, an energy island country is faced with threats posed to energy, economic, and national security. Āboltinš's identified features of energy islands are to be ascribed to the category of economic and technical ones. The Latvian author's study is complemented by introducing a category of political characteristics, which would comprise the factors of abuse and threats posed.
In case of Lithuania, the Russian Federation, as a dominant energy supplier, abused its dominant position which posed threats. Economic and technical features can be explained by figures, by energy interconnections, as well as by the presence or absence of regulatory environment, but how to explain the cases of abuse and threats?
For this purpose, we shall focus on the analysis of security conducted by Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde in their book Security. A New Framework for Analysis. 16 The authors expand a traditional notion of security analysis, arguing that security, as a separate type of policy, is applied not only to one but to various sectors (military, political, economic, environmental, and social).
17
Considering the Buzan et al. analysis of traditional and expanded theories of security, the following three security determinants may be identified: . 19 Ibidem.
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The chart shows Lithuania's primary energy mix in 2009 and 2010, as well as the objective of how its composition should change from 2016 to 2020. A horizontal line throughout the chart displays the degree of energy dependence on the Russian Federation. In 2010, Ignalina NPP was shut down, wherefore Lithuania's energy dependence on Russia went up to 80 per cent. It is true that nuclear fuel was also imported from Russia. On the one hand, it is possible to store nuclear fuel and accumulate larger reserves, which enhances the security of the energy supply; on the other hand, this does not reduce dependence on one supplier.
From 2010, the chart line divides into two: dotted and continuous (Figure 1). The dotted line represents a reference scenario, and shows that the level of dependence on Russia would reduce slightly only because of the expansion of the renewables part. Meanwhile, the continuous line going down indicates that it would be possible to diminish energy dependence on Russia considerably by developing the projects indicated near this line: in 2016, electricity interconnections with Sweden NordBalt and Poland LitPolLink as well as an LNG terminal; in 2020, a new Nuclear Power Plant, synchronization of electricity system with ENTSO-E, and gas interconnection with Poland.
It may be concluded that in 1990-2014, Lithuania's dependency on one energy supplier, that is, the Russian Federation, was extremely high.
Dependency on One Major Energy Source
The same chart (Figure 1 ) shows the trends of Lithuania's dependence on different sources of energy. In 1990-2010, Lithuania's primary energy mix was made up of nuclear energy, gas, and oil, each being about 30 per cent, as well as 10 per cent from indigenous resources. Nuclear energy played the crucial role -that is, the Ignalina NPP produced from 60 to 88.1 per cent of the country's electric power. 20 Shutting it down was a significant loss for local Lithuanian power generation. Table 1 presents the balance of Lithuania's energy supply alongside the working Ignalina NPP and without it. After the shutting down of Ignalina NPP, local generation of electricity and its export came to a halt and was replaced by imports constituting about 65 per cent of all electricity consumption. Lithuania became one of the largest importers of electricity in the European Union. 21 Imports of coal and natural gas increased, too. What remained as local production are the renewable sources of energy. From 2010, oil, gas, and part of electricity were imported from Russia; however, from a strategic point of view, the security supply of natural gas was the most significant at that time. The economic blockade experienced by Lithuania in 1990 -when the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) terminated the supply of raw materials, and of oil in particular, for a couple of months -demonstrated that although an oil refinery stopped operating, after some time oil products "found their way" to Lithuania. Hence, discontinuance of an oil supply would determine economic losses but not paralyze the country's life.
Gas crises between Russia and Ukraine in 2006 and 2009 showed that the consequences of natural gas supply cuts, especially in winter, can be way more severe. Figure 1 and Table 1 show that natural gas in 2010-2013 made up a considerable part of Lithuania's primary energy mix, the majority of Lithuania's thermal power plants of that period used gas, also the main power plant which replaced the halted Ignalina NPP 23 was gas powered. It may be concluded that until 2010, the determinant of dependence on one major source was not strong, yet after the shut down of the Ignalina NPP, Lithuania's dependence on natural gas became critical. 
Dependency on One Supply Route
Energy supply routes of the Baltic states are determined by historical and technical circumstances, and therefore, in 1990-2013, they were still integrated into a system of the former USSR and dependent on them. Figure 2 show that the gas transmission systems of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia were interconnected to Russia and Belarus only. There were no alternative gas supply routes, so the supply of natural gas was directly dependent on the Russian Federation. In the case of Lithuania, the supply of natural gas was conducted by the only pipeline through Kotlovka, while the other pipeline through Voranova, as shown in the map, did not operate. Lithuania's dependency on one major source of gas, as described in the previous chapter, was additionally determined by one supply route. In the electricity sector, the situation was practically identical. The map in Figure 3 shows that in 1990-2013, the electricity interconnections of the Baltic states were exclusively with Russia and Belarus, with the exception of the Estlink 1 interconnection, which started to operate between Estonia and Finland in 2006. However, due to its low capacity (350 MW), it had no major impact on the energy supply of the Baltic states, and especially for Lithuania. In addition to this, all three Baltic countries were and still are participants of the BRELL Ring 24 agreement and work synchronically with the former USSR system (IPS/UPS) (see Figure 4) , whose frequency is regulated from Russia. There is much broader variety of transportation means of oil and oil products, thus reducing a security risk of their supply. Lithuania's case in the oil sector differs from other Baltic countries since in north-western Lithuania one finds the biggest oil refinery in the region, the annual refining capacity of which is 15 million tons of crude oil. To secure exports of oil products and imports of crude oil, Būtingė oil terminal was constructed in 1999. The terminal can accommodate exports of up to 14 million tons of oil and imports up to 12 million tons per year. After the Russian Federation stopped the supply of oil via the Druzhba oil pipeline in July 2006, Būtingė oil terminal has operated in import regime and secured the supply of crude oil for the refinery.
Increasing Consumption of Energy
Lithuania and the EU energy consumption per capita show ( Table 2) that Lithuania's total energy consumption varies with only a slight increase since 2010, yet since constituting only two thirds of the EU average, has the potential to grow. Notwithstanding the halted Ingnalina NPP and the rise in electricity costs, final electricity consumption was progressively increasing; considering that it is made up of just more than half of the EU average, it is expected to grow further. Another important indicator is that of energy consumption intensity. Over the past two decades, Lithuania's indicators have improved more than two times, but they are still far behind the EU average. Lithuania's efforts in the field of energy efficiency should slightly reduce the growth rate of energy consumption. Energy consumption in Lithuania has a clear potential to grow, yet in the context of the security of energy supply, the factor of increasing energy consumption still does not play such a significant role as dependence on one major energy resource and on one supply route.
Limited or No Energy Market
Having withdrawn from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, all three Baltic states rather quickly implemented economic reforms and reforms of state regulation, yet the energy sector stagnated for the longest period. The absence of reforms may have been determined by natural monopoly in an energy market, large monopolistic energy companies, power and influence of the energy sector and the interest groups related to it.
Implementing the EU gas directive, on March 20, 2007, the Lithuanian Parliament adopted amendments to the Law on Natural Gas, stipulating that starting from July 1 of the same year, every consumer has the right to choose a gas supplier. Such consumers were free to choose. Although de jure the Seimas liberalized natural gas market, de facto it did not function yet, since all gas consumed in Lithuania was imported and sold to consumers by two suppliers only -AB Lietuvos dujos and UAB Dujotekana, for which gas supply quotas were granted by a sole external supplier, Gazprom.
28 Natural gas exchanges -Baltpool UAB and GET Baltic UAB -were established in 2012, though their activities were developing gradually. Considering these circumstances, it can be concluded that during the research period, there was no natural gas market in Lithuania.
Unlike gas, an electricity market in Lithuania was liberalized a little bit faster. Its legal framework was established in 2002, but only on January 1, 2010, did electricity market implementation principles enter into force, and five years were given for their realization. 29 Lithuanian power exchange UAB Baltpool was established at the end of 2009. Later, in 2012, its trade was transferred to the Nordic power market operator Nord Pool Spot. 30 Creation of a real, functioning power market required time. Therefore, it can be concluded that during the research period, the Lithuanian electricity market was limited. 
International Relations
The analysis of economic and technical criteria presented a clear and unequivocal view of Lithuania's energy dependence on the Russian Federation. Carrying out a case study of Lithuania, the subjects of analysing international relations are also clear -Lithuania and the Russian Federation.
In the case of Lithuania as an EU energy island, the relations between Lithuania and Russia are conditioned by historical circumstances. Lithuania's occupation and annexation executed by the Soviet Army in 1940 and continuous Soviet aggression against the Republic of Lithuania from 1940-1990 is to be considered as the main factor. 31 In 1990, the Lithuanian people stood apart from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, announcing that it was restoring an independent state, and paving the way for Euro-Atlantic integration. In 1990, a 74-day economic blockade of Lithuania, and the January 13, 1991 attempt of the Soviet Armed Forces to commit a coup d' état in Lithuania, show that the leaders of the Soviet Union did not accept the Lithuanian people's choice and tried to use force to return Lithuania to the USSR. In 2005, President Vladimir Putin, speaking in the Russian parliament, called the breakup of the USSR "the greatest geopolitical catastrophe". 32 As such, Russia's stance is not only inimical but also as posing a constant threat. The balance of power in favour of the Russian Federation, and Lithuania's energy dependency, created preconditions for Russia to dominate. On the one hand, membership of Lithuania and other Baltic states into the European Union and NATO strengthened the security of smaller countries, but on the other hand, it predetermined that the state border along the Baltic states with Russian federation would become a common border between different geopolitical regions.
Survival
Are threats posed by Russia of an existential nature as regards Lithuania? Are they real, or just imaginary?
To answer these questions, we refer to the study on Russian leverage on the CIS and Baltic states, conducted by experts Jakob Hendenskog and Robert Larsson at the Swedish Defence Research Agency. Investigating Russia's coercive energy policy, the experts found that in 1991-2006, Lithuania was subject to such a policy 17 times, Georgia -12, Belarus -8, Ukraine -5, Moldova -3, Estonia and Latvia -2 times each, and Armenia -1. 33 Types of Russia's coercive energy policies were the following: supply cuts -38 cases, coercive price policy -11, sabotage -4, threats without taking actions -2 cases, 34 and finally, the agents of Russia's coercive energy policy were: Gazprom -16, Transneft/ Lukoil -12, Itera -9, and other -14. 35 The experts conclude that Russia's usage of the energy lever as a means of influence has changed in style over time. During the 1990s, a higher degree of coercion was visible, while trends suggested that the lever during the last couple of years has changed toward a more sophisticated approach, increasingly utilized in the grey zone between politics and economics. Russia's overarching energy politics perspective is guided by its strategic ambitions and geopolitical orientations".
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In 2006, Russia terminated oil supply to Lithuania through the Druzhba pipeline. An eerie coincidence is that it was in 2006 when the Russian government stopped the activities of the Yukos oil company and the Polish PKN Orlen became one of the major owners of the Lithuanian oil refinery. The Russian Federation ignored many requests of the Lithuanian government and EU leaders to restore oil supply via the Druzhba pipeline and financial support proposed by the company. Oil transportation through the Druzhba pipeline has not been re-established, and crude oil from Russia to the Lithuania oil refinery is supplied by ships in the Baltic Sea, which is more expensive and poses environmental risks.
Figure 5 presents a chart of Europe's dependence on Russian gas (2014). Lithuania is displayed on a vertical axis at 100 per cent. That means that Lithuania's dependence on Russian gas is 100 per cent, while the ability to cope with disruption of natural gas supply is equal to zero. After having closed the Ignalina NPP, natural gas became the one major energy source of Lithuania, therefore the risks of cutting off the supply of natural gas are to be considered as critical and even of existential importance. 33 The Centre for Strategic Studies carried an economic security study in which it is stated that: the energy sector differs from other state sectors in the existence of the vast potential of a "threshold effect". 38 This "threshold effect" points to the state cross-sectorial vulnerability -the more separate state sectors are integrated (interdependent), the more serious damage for the state may cause cut of supply of energy sources. Hence interruption of supply of energy sources will have negative effect not only for energy sector but to a lesser or greater extent for other state sectors too. In this regard, energy security is directly interrelated with military, political, economic, ecological, communicative/informative, and other sectors of state security. Thus threats posed to the energy security will embrace other state security levels. 39 Taking into consideration the potential of threats to the energy sector to spread, it can be said that economic and national security can be ensured only after having ensured the energy security. On January 1, 2006, Russia cut off natural gas supplies to Ukraine. It was winter, so the consequences were serious not only for Ukraine but also for those countries dependent on the transit of gas through Ukraine -that is, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, and partially Poland. The countries of Western Europe were faced with major consequences and Russia was under threat of income losses and of possible sanctions. In order to solve the issue of transit of natural gas to Western Europe, the Russian Federation decided to "bypass" Central and Eastern Europe and initiated two new projects: NordStream 1 and 2 in the north, through the Baltic Sea, and South Stream or Turk Stream in the south, through the Black Sea. In this way, Russia will guarantee not only a smooth supply of natural gas to Western Europe and revenues to the budget, but it will also create the possibility of disrupting the supply of gas to Central and Eastern Europe, including the Baltic countries and Lithuania. There would be considerable room for abuse, manipulation, and implementation of Russia's favourite policy "divide and rule".
Hendenskog and Larsson identified Gazprom and Transneft/Lukoil as agents of Russia's coercive policy. 41 In the case of Lithuania, in 2004-2014, Gazprom was one of AB Lietuvos dujos shareholders: E.ON Ruhrgas Int GmbH -38,9%, Gazprom -37,1%, the Republic of Lithuania -17,7%, others -6,3%. Respectively, German and Russian companies each had two representatives in the Board of AB Lietuvos dujos, while Lithuania had one. All activities were hereupon integrated in this company: supply, transmission, and distribution. Hence the Board of AB Lietuvos dujos took decisions upon gas prices, development of transmission and distribution systems, and others. Participation of Gazprom's representatives in the management of AB Lietuvos dujos created a vertically integrated monopoly: Valerij Golubev 42 at the same time was a Deputy Chairman of Gazprom's Management Committee and a member of the Board of AB Lietuvos dujos and its chairman. Monopoly worked as follows: Golubev, as member or chairman of the Board of AB Lietuvos dujos, was approving the gas price offered by Golubev as Deputy Chairman of Gazprom's Management Committee or, in other words, Golubev was buying gas from himself. As a result, the gas price of Gazprom for AB Lietuvos dujos was one of the highest in Europe.
43 AB Lietuvos dujos managed gas pipelines (transmission and distribution systems) too, therefore the Board of the company decided upon the development of a transmission system and upon the building of international interconnections, for example, with Poland. However, the question is whether Gazprom represented by Golubev needed alternative routes of gas supply in Lithuania? The answer is no. Monopoly supplier is interested in having an isolated market with no competition. The fact that Golubev worked at the KGB of the Soviet Union 44 points to his relationship with the Kremlin, and presupposes that along with economic, geopolitical goals were pursued by Gazprom, too. At that time, Gazprom was a supplier of natural gas to E.ON Rurhgas Int GmbH, therefore Gazprom was in a dominant position as regards German shareholders and representatives of the latter German company and the Board of AB Lietuvos dujos were not at all interested to come into conflict with the representatives of Gazprom because of the interests of small Lithuania.
U.S. analyst Zeyno Baran points out that "energy dependence also increases Moscow's political and economic influence over importing countries. 45 Moscow is still not shy about using energy infrastructure, created in the USSR, as a powerful instrument of control. Russia used this leverage for two related objectives -that is, to raise revenues and to suppress democratization and economic liberalization". 46 Energy security is directly interlinked with economic and national security.
Speaking of Lithuania's dependence on the supply of natural gas as a major energy resource by using only one route, it is worthwhile mentioning the Kaliningrad factor. Kaliningrad is a territory of the Russian Federation; it is geographically detached from the rest of the country, located on the Baltic Sea coast and encircled by Poland and Lithuania. For this reason, energy supply to Kaliningrad is carried out in transit through Belarus and Lithuania (see Figure 2 and Figure 3 ). Natural gas is used in Kaliningrad to generate heat and electricity. So, Kaliningrad is also in some sort of an energy island directly dependent on transit through Belarus and Lithuania. In this regard, one could argue that Kaliningrad is a serious leverage point for Lithuania in the negotiations with the Russian Federation on natural gas supply. It is true that Lithuania has a real possibility to regulate, or if it wishes, to stop the supply of natural gas to the geographically separated territory of the Russian Federation. It would, however, be destructive, create a conflict, and is certainly not the way to go for the twenty-first century international community.
Mobilization
According to Buzan et al., mobilization is the particular endeavours or authority used to deal with existential threats. In the Lithuanian case, it was the Commission established by the Government of the Republic of Lithuania in February 2008 with the purpose to ensure the security of energy supply after 2009, i.e. final shut down of Ignalina NPP, which was headed by former Prime Minister of the Republic of Lithuania Abišala. 47 During the research period, it was the only commission of such kind, and therefore it should be regarded as an exceptional effort with the authorities. In January 2009, the Ministry of Energy (separating energy functions from the Ministry of Economy) was established in Lithuania, thus indicating that the energy sector is of high importance, and in 2012, the National Energy Independence Strategy of the Republic of Lithuania was approved. 48 At the EU level, by the end of 2008, the European Commission initiated the Baltic Energy Market Interconnection Plan. This was the first, and unprecedented, EU regional energy policy initiative where one of its main objectives was to eliminate the energy isolation of the Baltic countries. The facts mentioned point to clear mobilization of the efforts across Lithuania and the EU. ***4. How to Break out from an Energy Island?
In 2010, Lithuania became an energy island, and in 2015 managed to free itself from it. How did it manage to do so? The following main factors may be identified, which enabled a break out:
• political will; • creation of alternative supply routes of natural gas and electricity; • establishment of gas and electricity markets; • employment of legal measures; • use of indigenous resources; • regional cooperation.
Political will
In 1990, Lithuania restored independence. The young democracy still underwent internal political struggles. After fifty years of occupation and demanded obedience, a number of Lithuanian politicians and state officials inertly and psychologically could not oppose the main successor state to the Soviet Union, that is, Russia, especially after the 1992 elections to the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania -when the Democratic Labour Party (founded on December 8, 1990, on the basis of the Communist Party of Lithuania) won a parliamentary majority. It was hard to find a political consensus on the issues of state governance. Unlike any other, in the energy sector Russia's influence was still very strong, financial interests were dominating. Therefore some big mistakes were made. Gazprom's influence in the management of the strategically important AB Lietuvos dujos and a vertical monopoly was created by Lithuania itself, having sold 37% of the shares to a Russian gas giant in 2004. The key argument for this decision was to ensure the security of supply of natural gas to Lithuania, yet the half-century entrenched relationship with the capital of the Soviet Union did play its role, too. An analogous situation could be observed in Latvia and Estonia: Gazprom became one of the biggest shareholders in major gas companies of other Baltic states, and this proves Russia's considerable influence still prevailing at that time.
However, the crisis of an energy island and its attendant threats forced mobilization. In 2012, Lithuania approved the National Energy Independence rategy, 49 where it was stipulated that "the highest priority is to ensure Lithuania's energy independence by the year 2020, ensuring free choice of energy resources and their ways of supply". 50 Energy independence means the ability to choose freely. The strategy also identified the main measures 51 enabling Lithuania to achieve the key objective of Lithuania's energy independence, that is, "to move to an absolutely different geopolitical environment with different values, based on market and competition".
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Mobilization of political will was not an easy and consistent process. A majority of the measures identified were successfully implemented, however, a part of them are still being realized. The future of a new nuclear power plant project became uncertain, because it has been politicized 53 -the project has become a tool of internal political struggles and a hostage of fictitious competition created by Russia with the start of two new nuclear power plants in Kaliningrad and Belarus. According to energy expert Alhaji, "nothing hurts energy security more than politicizing it". 
Alternative Routes of Energy Supply
Alternative supply routes seem to be the first thought which come into one's mind when thinking of breaking out from an energy island. Lithuanian) . 50 Ibidem, para 27 (in Lithuanian). 51 Ibidem, para 33 (in Lithuanian): "1) ['In natural gas sector: insuring alternative sources and ways of supply (LNG) and security of supply (enhancement of internal transmission system)']; 2) ['in electricity sector: creation of competitive internal power generation capacities (regional NPP in Visaginas), power interconnections with Sweden (NordBalt) and with Poland (LitPolLink 1 and LitPolLink 2), functioning regional power marker, sybchronization with ENTSO-E power networks of continental Europe and increasing energy production from renewables, based on the economic and technical benefit analysis']; 3) ['creation of market relations in energy sector: restructuring of energy sector (electricity, gas, heat) according the provisions of the third EU energy package']. 52 Ibidem, para 33. 53 Švedas, R., Vilpišauskas R. (2015) , "Kodėl Visagino atominės elektrinės projektas patyrė politinę nesėkmę?", Nakrošis V., Barcevičius E., Vilpišauskas R., red., Kada reformos virsta pokyčiais?, Vilnius: Vilniaus universiteto leidykla. 54 Alhaji A. F., "What Is Energy Security?", Energy Politics, Issue IV, 2008, p. 68.
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LNG terminal, thus satisfying more than 80 per cent of the Baltic states gas demand. 55 All this made an end for Gazprom's monopoly and prevented any threats of cut-offs by bypassing the Baltic states across the Baltic Sea via the Nord Stream pipeline. The LNG terminal "Independence" has played a crucial and symbolic role of liberation and became of regional importance. The Gas Interconnection Poland-Lithuania, the GIPL Project (2,4 billion m³ per year with a possibility to increase up to 4,1 billion m³ per year), to come into operation in 2022, will create one more alternative supply route, connecting the Baltic and Central European gas systems, and expanding the possibilities of using the LNG terminal. By 2021, Lithuanian-Latvian gas interconnection capacities will be increased and by 2020 Estonian-Finish gas interconnection Balticconnector (2 billion m³ per year) is to be built. Figure 7 shows the development of the electricity interconnections of Lithuania and other Baltic states. First, alongside the operating Estlink 1 electricity interconnection, Estlink 2 (650 MW), between Estonia and Finland, was built in 2014. Later, in 2015, two more international interconnections started to operate: Swedish-Lithuanian NordBalt (700 MW) and LitPolLink (500 MW first stage) between Lithuania and Poland. New electricity interconnections linking the Baltic states to Finland, Sweden, and Poland created a major change on the geoenergy map of the Baltic Sea region, eliminating dependence of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia on one supplier. It is true that the BRELL agreement is still in force, therefore a strategic objective of the Baltic states is to synchronize their own power systems with the ENTSO-E Continental Europe power system. The third electricity interconnection (500/600 MW), between Latvia and Estonia, is to be built by 2020, which will increase transmission capacities, resolve the issue of a "bottleneck" between Latvia and Estonia, and further consolidate a common electricity market of the Baltic states. 
Gas and Electricity Markets
In the previous chapters it was mentioned 57 that notwithstanding the established legal framework, the gas market in Lithuania and other Baltic states did not work. The main reasons were absence of alternative routes of energy supply, as well as the dominance of Gazprom's vertical monopoly. The same year of 2014, when the LNG terminal "Independence" began to work in Klaipėda, Lithuania fully implemented the European Union's Third Energy Package. This fact is of crucial importance in the legal and symbolic sense. Being small, dependent, and vulnerable, Lithuania is the first state of the former USSR to break the vertical monopoly of the gas giant Gazprom controlled by the Russian authorities (see Table 3 ). Since 2015, there have been two routes of natural gas supply to Lithuania: gas transmission pipelines from Russia through Belarus, and through the LNG terminal in the port of Klaipėda. There are also two gas exchanges in Lithuania: GET Baltic and Baltpool, while Gazprom is participating in a transparent competitive market along with other suppliers. The price of natural gas for Lithuania diminished significantly (see Figure 8) . In the electricity sector, all the necessary legal framework was already adopted, a power exchange was established, all preparatory work for integration into the Nordic countries' power exchange were completed -electricity interconnections were what was missing.
58 Therefore, from 2015 -when electricity interconnections with Sweden (NodBalt) and Poland (LitPolLink) were built -the practical and qualitative status of the Lithuanian power market has changed -it became a fullfledged participant of the Nordic countries' power market Nord Pool. 
Legal Measures
Notwithstanding that legal disputes are complex, costly, and time-consuming, defending national interests by legal measures is to be considered an important political factor. Appeals to international arbitration or other dispute settlement institutions demonstrate a struggle and non-conciliation, irrespective of how the legal dispute ends. Not questioning the activities of an energy supplier abusing its dominant position indicates the existence not only of energy or economic, but also of political, dominance.
On October 3, 2012, Lithuania filed a lawsuit against Gazprom at the Stockholm Arbitration. The Lithuanian side argued that "according to the public conditions of privatization and privatization agreement of AB Lietuvos dujos of 2004, Gazprom undertook the commitment to supply natural gas to 58 Ibidem. 59 www.nordpoolspot.com
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Unfortunately, Lithuania has no good news on energy efficiency and saving. Lithuania's energy intensity is still 1.66 times larger than the EU average, which Lithuania is expected to reach by 2030. 73 Lithuania does not hold fossil fuels, yet new technologies have expanded its possibilities in this sphere, too. "Referring to the preliminary results of the U.S. Energy Information Administration, the resources of shale gas found in Lithuania can reach 481 billion m³, from which one could derive technically about 25 per cent, that is more than 100 billion m³. Such amount of gas would satisfy Lithuanian needs for 30 to 40 years, according to the present level of gas consumption. According to the data of Lithuanian geologists, resources of shale gas in Western Lithuania amounts to 585 billion m³ from which one could technically obtain from 10 to 15 per cent (60-90 billion m³)". 74 In June 2012 an open international tender was announced for search and extraction of shale gas. U.S. Chevron Corporation won it. 75 Lithuania, however, did not start to extract shale gas, because the local community was against it and the central government did not manage to establish a dialogue to find mutual understanding. Also, the Lithuanian legal framework on this topic was still not well developed. The topic of shale gas was politicized, and in 2013, Chevron Corporation announced they were leaving the tender. The process of shale gas extraction was terminated.
nections, were isolated and vulnerable, and identified the objective of the BE-MIP Action Plan, 77 a high-level working group, consisting of the representatives of all EU Baltic Sea region member states, was set up to draft this plan. In eight months, the BEMIP was prepared, and on June 17, 2009, it was signed by the President of the European Commission and the heads of state of the EU Baltic Sea countries. The BEMIP included two documents: 1) the Action Plan and 2) the Memorandum of Understanding. In the first document, working methods were agreed upon; specific measures and actions as to how common electricity and gas markets should be established; medium to long-term projects of electricity generation as well as electricity and gas interconnections, etc. Energy projects were listed in tables, indicating their titles, implementation calendar, planned budget, related projects, and responsible institutions or companies. 78 The second document, which endorsed the Action Plan, was granted political support by the signatures of the heads of state and President of the European Commission. 79 It should be noted that a document of such complexity was prepared by eight Member States of the Baltic Sea region and the European Commission within eight months. No less surprising that it was implemented keeping the same fast pace. Monitoring of the BEMIP Action plan implementation was conducted by the same high-level working group of the EU Member States of the Baltic Sea region and the European Commission, progress reports were prepared annually. 80 Norway also participated in this process as an observer.
The table below provides the chronological list of implemented projects and works completed with regard to Lithuania and other Baltic states.
tion plan, played a crucial role in eliminating the energy isolation of Lithuania and the Baltic states.
Conclusions
EU territories isolated from the rest of the EU energy systems normally are considered as EU energy islands. Being on an energy island poses additional threats, therefore, there is an aim to eliminate them across the EU.
An energy island can be described by economic, technical, and political criteria. Relevance of these criteria depends on historical and geographical conditions, and must be examined on a case-by-case basis.
Having conducted a case study of Lithuania as an EU energy island, it became clear that in 1990-2009, Lithuania corresponded to all criteria, except one, which, as the Ignalina NPP was still in operation until 2010, is dependence on one major energy source. However, in 2010-2013, Lithuania, corresponded to all economic, technical, and political characteristics, that is it was on an EU energy island with all attendant threats and possible impacts. Lithuania depended upon one energy supplier -the Russian Federation, and upon one major energy source -natural gas, supplied through the only pipeline across Belarus. Energy consumption in Lithuania had a potential to increase, while the energy market was still only de jure and did not work de facto. Lithuania's relations with an energy supplier, the Russian Federation, were tense, based on enmity; the balance of power was clearly on the Russian side. Clear sub-regional systems were formed in the region. The energy importer depended upon the energy supplier, while the latter dominated and abused its advantageous position. The threats posed were real. The Russian Federation carried out a policy of coercion in the energy sector, hence creating objective threats not only to energy security, but also to economic and national security. Such threats are to be identified as critical and even existential because they are pursuing geopolitical aims, suppressing democratization, and economic liberalization. All these mobilized endeavours, undertaken by Lithuania and the European Union, which enabled Lithuania to break out from an energy island. Notwithstanding, Russia, by implementing the projects of the Astravets nuclear power plant in Belarus and the Baltic nuclear power plant in Kaliningrad (the Russian Federation), still seeks to retain and create new instruments of domination in the region.
The year 2015 is to be regarded as a turning point in the termination of energy isolation and breaking away from an energy island. Attaining this, Lithuania demonstrated its political will, raising the issue of energy security high 209 on the national and EU political agendas, furthermore, Lithuania managed to build alternative electricity and natural gas supply routes which enabled the functionality of a real energy market. Regional cooperation was a milestone in this process. Its energy interests in Lithuania defended by all possible legal measures, too. Also, Lithuania sought to ensure the security of energy supply by utilizing indigenous and renewable energy sources at full strength, where, in 2015, for the first time, the share of biofuel in the heating sector had exceeded the share of natural gas.
Developed EU energy island study model, embracing economic, technical, and political criteria, is to be regarded as appropriate to conduct energy island case studies.
In 2010-2013 Lithuania constituted a classic case of an energy island. Also, Lithuania, like other Baltic states, created a precedent of breaking out from an energy island and created a good practice both to study and to follow.
Vilnius, January 2017

